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ver the past twenty years, private sector
retirement saving in the United States has
changed dramatically. There has been a transition
from employer-provided defined benefit pensions
to personal retirement accounts.These individually
managed and controlled retirement accounts first
became popular with the introduction of
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) in the
early 1980s. Today, a number of other programs,
known by the numbers of the Internal Revenue
Code section that define them, have overtaken
IRAs.These include 401(k) plans for private sector
employees, 403(b) plans for employees of non-
profit organizations, 457 plans for state and local
government employees, the Thrift Savings Plan for
federal employees, and Keogh plans for self-
employed workers.
Contributions to these plans, and the assets held in
these plans, have grown enormously in the last two
decades, while employer-provided defined benefit
(DB) pension plans have declined in importance.
In 1980, 92 percent of private retirement saving
contributions were to employer-based plans. Of
these contributions, 64 percent were to DB plans,
while the remaining contributions were to conven-
tional employer-sponsored defined contribution
(DC) plans. In 1999, including conventional DC
plans, about 85 percent of private contributions
were to accounts in which individuals controlled
how much to contribute to the plan, how to invest
plan assets, and how and when to withdraw money
from the plans.
In this brief note, which draws heavily on our
recent longer paper, PVW (2001), we describe the
recent changes in the magnitude and the composi-
tion of saving for retirement.We focus primarily on
aggregate data on retirement plan assets and con-
tributions.Aggregate retirement saving plan assets
have grown sharply over the past twenty-five years.
We describe how these changes are related to the
shift from employer-sponsored defined benefit
plans to personal retirement saving. We conclude
by discussing several broader issues, such as the
relationship between retirement plan saving,which
is close to eight percent of personal income, and
the National Income and Product Account (NIPA)
personal saving rate, which is now close to zero.
Retirement plan assets
Aggregate retirement plan assets include assets in
employer DB pension funds and in conventional
employer-sponsored individual DC plans, as well
as assets in 401(k) plans, IRAs, Keogh plans, and
other personal retirement accounts. Figure 1 shows
the ratio of assets in all of these private retirement
plans, as reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s
Flow of Funds Accounts, to private sector wage
and salary earnings. This ratio increased from
0.39 to 2.02 between 1975 and 1998, the latest year
for which we have data. The figure also shows the
ratio of assets in all retirement plans, private plans
as well as public sector plans, to total wages and
salaries; this ratio tracks the private sector ratio
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lation aging on labor markets and household saving.very closely.The figure shows modest growth in the
ratio of retirement assets to earnings through 1981,
more rapid growth between 1982 and 1994 follow-
ing the introduction of IRAs and 401(k) plans and
during a period of positive stock market returns,
and rapidly accelerated growth beginning in 1995,
corresponding to large increases in equity market
returns.1 The ratio has probably declined some-
what in the 1998-2001 period, as real stock market
values have fallen.
Figure 2 dis-aggregates private retirement assets
into several components. It shows that assets in
DB plans continued to grow after the intro-
duction of 401(k) and IRA plans, but that most of
the growth of retirement assets since the early
1980s has been in individual
accounts.Moreover,there is no
evidence of a decline in the
assets in DB plans during the
time period when assets in
individual accounts were grow-
ing most rapidly.
There is some debate about
whether there is a linkage
between the slowdown in the
growth of DB assets and the
rise of assets in individually
managed accounts. The forego-
ing data alone cannot address
the possibility of substitution of
DC plans for DB plans since we
do not have data on the time path that other retire-
ment plan assets would have followed in the
absence of the growth in DC assets.One suggestive
calculation, however, considers what would have
happened if all contributions to personal retire-
ment accounts between 1985 and 1998 had come at
the expense of DB contributions.In this case,if DC
assets had not increased but the contributions had
gone instead to DB plans, DB assets would have
grown by a factor of 8.4 instead of 2.7.2
The private retirement assets in Figure 2 exclude
assets in federal, state, and local retirement plans,
and assets held by life insurance companies in
retirement plans,that are also part of the retirement
asset pool.3 Figure 3 shows the assets in private
plans as well as the assets in these other plans. In
1999, about 40 percent of all retirement assets were
in federal, state and local, and insurance plan funds.
The increase in retirement plan
assets relative to income shown
in Figure 1 is not mirrored in
rising values of other assets.
The case of equity in owner-
occupied housing is particularly
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1 The IRA and 401(k) programs were both greatly expanded in
1982.The IRA program was subsequently scaled back in 1986.
2 A substantial literature, reviewed in
PVW (2001), suggests that much of the
decline in DB pensions has to do with the
decline of industries that traditionally
offered DB plans and the increasing reg-
ulatory burden on firms offering DB
plans.
3 The Flow of Funds accounts define the
latter series as including “assets of pri-
vate pension plans held at life insurance
companies, such as guaranteed invest-
ment contracts and variable annuity
plans,that are managed for the benefit of
individuals who are not separately iden-




only a small fraction
of the large change
in retirement assets
interesting, since housing equity is the most impor-
tant asset of a large fraction of Americans.Housing
equity relative to income has not increased over
the past two and one-half decades. Figure 4 shows
housing equity as a fraction of disposable income
from 1975 to 1998. The ratio increased about
25 percent between 1975 and 1989, but by 1999 it
was essentially at the same level as in 1975.The fig-
ure also shows non-retirement-non-home-equity
net worth as a share of disposable income. This
ratio decreased and then increased between 1985
and 1999. The increase between 1975 and 1999,
27 percent, was not nearly as great as the increase
in retirement assets over this period.
The growth of retirement assets relative to income
may be “explained” by a number of factors. These
include the advent of new retirement saving vehi-
cles, as well as other factors such as demographic
change. Changes in three fea-
tures of the population – demo-
graphic composition, mortality
rates, and labor force participa-
tion – have likely contributed
to the rise in retirement assets
relative to income. None of
these factors seems capable,
either alone or in tandem, of
explaining the observed growth
in retirement assets.
The increase in life expectancy
at retirement age is the first sub-
stantial change that may have
contributed to rising retirement
assets. In 1975, life expectancy
for a U.S.man at age 62 was 15.5 years,while that for
a woman was 20.3 years. By 1997, male life
expectancy at age 62 had increased to 17.6 years,
while female life expectancy had risen to 21.4 years.
For men, this implies a 13.5 percent increase in the
number of years that need to be supported with
retirement resources, beginning at age 62. For
women, the change was 5.4 percent. These propor-
tional changes provide a crude measure of the
increase in retirement resources that would be
needed to offset improved longevity.These changes
might account for an increase in resources of rough-
ly ten percent, much less than the actual growth of
retirement assets relative to income.
The second important demographic change that
might have contributed to rising retirement assets
is the aging of the labor force.Translating informa-
tion on the age structure of the population into
predictions about the wealth to
income ratio requires detailed
information on saving by age,
yet there is no agreement on
the relative importance of life-
cycle, precautionary, and other
factors in saving decisions. In
1975, the average age of those
over the age of 20 in the U.S.
population was 44.6 years. For
men, the average age was
43.9 years. Between 1975 and
1985 the average age of those
over 20 actually declined, to
44.3 years for the entire popu-
lation and 43.5 years for the
male population. This reflected
Figure 3
Figure 4the entry of the “baby boom”
cohorts into the 20-plus age
group. By 1998, the working
age population had grown
older: the average age of all
20-plus persons was 45.5 years,
and that of 20-plus men was
44.8 years. Thus between 1985
and 1998, the average age of
the adult population rose by
just over one year. Similarly,
the average age of those in the
labor force in 1985 was
38.5 years, while in 1998, it was
40.3 years. Thus, in the late
1990s, those who were in their
earning years were older and
had fewer remaining years of work to accumulate
assets for retirement than those in the working
population in the 1970s and early 1980s. But these
changes were modest.
The final change that may have affected retirement
assets is the shifting age of retirement in the U.S.
population. During the 1980s and 1990s, these
changes were modest by comparison to earlier
decades.Burtless and Quinn (2000) present detailed
information on age-specific labor force participa-
tion rates for U.S. men in 1970, 1984-5, and 1998-9.
Their data show a sharp decline in labor force par-
ticipation rates between 1970 and 1984-5, but rela-
tively little decline subsequently. At ages above 65,
the labor force participation rate in the late 1990s
was greater than that in the mid-1980s. There is no
systematic difference in labor force participation
rates at younger ages. Labor force participation
rates for women in their early 60s increased
between the mid-1980s and the
late 1990s, as cohorts of women
with greater labor force partici-
pation rates when they were
younger entered the retirement-
age cohort.
Changes in retirement ages are
therefore not likely to account
for substantial changes in
retirement wealth relative to
income during the last two
decades.Demographic factors –
shifting age structure and
lengthening life expectancy–
seem likely to account for mod-
est increases in retirement assets, but they are
unlikely to account for more than a small fraction
of the large changes we observe.
Retirement assets flows
The accumulation of retirement assets depends on
the inflow of contributions, the payout of benefits,
and the return on invested assets. Figure 5a shows
private pension plan contributions, which in-
creased almost six-fold between 1975 and 1999,
while Figure 5b shows contributions to all retire-
ment plans. Neither of the series include contribu-
tions to privately held pension plans administered
by insurance companies, which hold about 9 per-
cent of the assets in all pension plans. IRA
“rollover”contributions,in which assets are moved
from another defined contribution plan to an IRA,






much of the change
in retirement wealth
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The pronounced “hump” in retirement plan contri-
butions between 1982 and 1986 corresponds to the
beginning and subsequent retrenchment of the
IRA program. The pattern strongly suggests that
IRA contributions during this
period were not offset by a
reduction in other forms of
retirement saving.This suggests
that the total pool of assets in
retirement plans would likely
be much greater today if the
IRA program had not been lim-
ited in 1986.
Figure 6a shows both private
and total retirement plan con-
tributions scaled by disposable
income, while Figure 6b shows
the same contributions scaled
by private and total earnings.
We define these ratios as
“retirement plan contribution
rates.” They measure the pro-
portion of current earnings that
is saved in retirement accounts
by current employees. Our
analysis below compares retire-
ment plan contribution rates to
NIPA national saving rates.
Figures 6a and 6b show that
“retirement plan contribution
rates” are remarkably stable
over most of the last 25 years.
Scaled by personal disposable
income, the private plan contri-
bution rate was about 3.5 per-
cent in 1975 and in 1999, and the contribution rate
for all plans varied between 5 and 6 percent for
most of the period.When scaled by private and by
all wage and salary earnings, the contribution rates
are also stable, although they
are greater than the rates
scaled by personal disposable
income. The retirement plan
contribution rate for all plans,
including those in the federal
and state and local government
sector, is near 8 percent for
most of the period, or about
two percentage points higher
than the rate for the private
sector alone.
The relative stability in the
retirement plan contribution
rates was broken only by a
Figure 6a
Figure 6b
Figure 7large increase in the plan con-
tribution rate when the IRA
program was initiated, and a
decrease when the program
was curtailed in 1986. Relative
to earnings, both the private
and the all plan rates are about
2 percentage points higher dur-
ing this period.
Time Series Changes in the
“Retirement Plan
Contribution Rate”
The relative stability of the
retirement plan contribution
rate conceals fluctuations in
some of the factors that affect
this rate. Contributions to pri-
vate DC plans increased
sharply over the 1975-1999
period, while DB contributions
varied widely.At the end of this
period, DB plan contributions
were only slightly higher than
at the beginning.
Retirement plan contributions
are the product of the number
of participants and the average
contribution per participant.
Figure 7 shows the sum of the
number of active participants in all defined benefit
and defined contribution plans.4 It illustrates in
particular the rapid growth of 401(k) plans. These
plans, which first became available in 1982, grew to
almost 38 million participants by 1997. While
401(k) plan participation grew in the 1980s and
1990s, participation in DB plans declined from
about 30 million in 1984 to about 23 million by
1997. Participation in non-401(k) DC plans
increased until about 1986 and then declined, end-
ing the period about 30 percent higher than at the
beginning.In total,the number of plan participants
increased from about 39 million in 1975 to over 80
million in 1997.
Figure 8a shows contributions per participant in DB,
all DC, and 401(k) plans. The contributions to all
DC plans include 401(k) contributions. Figure 8b
shows IRA and 401(k) contributions. DB contribu-
tions per participant fluctuated substantially during
the last two decades,and they were about 40 percent
higher at the end of the period than at the begin-
ning. Non-401(k) DC contributions per participant
roughly doubled over the period, and on average
were higher than DB contributions.
Over the past fifteen years, contributions per par-
ticipant to 401(k) plans averaged twice the contri-
butions per participant to DB plans. During the
“unrestricted” IRA period, 1982-1986, IRA contri-
butions on average were greater than 401(k) con-
tributions. Recent legislative changes will raise the
limits on IRA contributions between 2002 and









4 These data, from Form 5500 filings and IRS tabulations of tax
returns, show the number of persons participating in each type of
retirement saving plan.Many persons participate in more than one
plan, so the total number of participants overstates the number of
persons who participate in at least one plan. For 401(k) plans, par-
ticipants include all persons eligible to contribute, regardless of




Figure 9 shows the trend in the number of partici-
pants in all plans combined and the trend in aver-
age contributions per participant.These two trends
together yield an increase in total contributions.
Since many individuals participate in more than
one plan, and this results in double counting in the
data on participants,the increase in average contri-
butions per unique covered employee would be
substantially higher than that shown in Figure 9.
DB Contributions and the Retirement Plan
Contribution Rate
Figure 10 shows an index of defined benefit plan
contributions per participant. It also shows an
index for the number of participants, and the flow
of contributions, to these plans. There are at least
three reasons for the erratic variation in contribu-
tions to DB plans. The first is the slight rise and
then steady decline in the num-
ber of active participants (cur-
rent employees) in DB plans
over the 1975–98 period.
A second is the link between
returns on DB plan assets and
current funding decisions.
Benefits promised by DB plans
are prescribed by a formula,
which is typically based on
years of service and final salary.
Promised benefits are a liability
of the firm, and the firm must
insure that assets held in the
plan are sufficient to cover this
liability. Other things equal, a
rise in investment returns increases DB asset bal-
ances relative to obligations, thereby reducing the
need for additional contributions.
A third reason for the fluctuation in DB contribu-
tions is the series of legislative changes that limit-
ed the level of benefits that could be funded under
DB plans and discouraged firms from over-funding
their pension plans. Prior to 1986, firms could fund
their DB plans to a level greater than their legal
liability. A series of laws beginning with a 10 per-
cent reversion tax, which was part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, put stricter limits on funding.
Ippolito [2001] estimates that in the absence of
various funding restrictions, DB pension assets in
1995 would have been 28 percent higher. Schieber
and Shoven [1997] report that when the limits on
contributions to over-funded plans, that were part
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, took effect, 48 percent of a sample of large
pension plans were precluded
from making further contribu-
tions.
The substantial fluctuations in
the DB plan contribution rate
raises questions about how
changes in DB plan contribu-
tions affect the retirement plan
contribution rate. Total DB
contributions are the product
of the number of DB plan par-
ticipants and the average con-
tribution per participant.
Fluctuations are due largely to
movements in the contribution
Figure 9
Figure 10per participant. Figure 11 provides information on
DB, DC, and Keogh contributions per participant
over the 1975-1997 period. It shows that the earn-
ings of wage and salary workers increased roughly
150 percent over this period. DC plan contribu-
tions per participant increased about 150 percent
as well,as one would expect if contributions were a
proportion of wage earnings. On the other hand,
DB contributions per participant fluctuated and on
average fell relative to wages.
Suppose that there had been no legislation limiting
contributions to DB plans, that market returns had
not affected DB contributions, that life expectancy
at retirement had been constant, and that there
were no changes in the demographic structure of
the workforce covered by DB plans. If the returns
on DB plan assets were in line with expectations,
one might have expected DB contributions per
participant, relative to wages, to remain roughly
constant. Given rising life
expectancy and an aging work-
force, one might have expected
contributions per employee to
increase relative to wages.
To explore the effects of down-
ward pressures on DB plan
contributions due to both leg-
islative changes and better-
than-expected asset returns, we
construct a “what if” scenario.
Considering  the private sector
only, suppose that DB contri-
butions per employee had
increased at the same rate as
wages in every year after 1977.
Figure 12 shows the private
retirement plan contribution
rate under this counterfactual,
together with the actual rate.
The saving rate under this
counterfactual assumption is
one percentage point higher
than the actual rate at the end
of the period.In the years when
the DB contribution rate was at
its lowest, the counterfactual
saving rate was close to 2 per-
centage points higher than the
actual rate. This counterfactual
suggests that legislative
changes and unexpectedly
favorable returns on DB plan assets probably
reduced the private retirement plan contribution
rate by a substantial amount.
The aggregate data also suggest that the retirement
plan contribution rate would have been substan-
tially higher were it not for the curtailment of the
IRA program. Between 1982 and 1985, IRA saving
added approximately 2.3 percentage points to the
retirement plan contribution rate. Today, it
accounts for only 0.3 percentage points.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that
aggregate retirement assets increased dramatical-
ly over the past two decades. All else equal, this
reduces the likelihood that the rise of assets in
DC retirement plans was offset by a reduction of
assets in DB plans. This conclusion is consistent
with the findings in previous studies using house-





in line with wages
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but low level of NIPA
saving
financial assets with the advent of 401(k) and IRA
plans.
The decline in DB plans was probably due to many
factors other than the growth of DC plans.
Gustman and Steinmeier [1992], for example, find
that at least half of the trend in DB plans from
1977 to 1985 “is due to a shift in employment mix
towards firms with industry, size, and union status
that have historically been associated with lower
defined benefit rates.” Ippolito [1995] concludes
that “about half of the shift is attributable to a loss
of employment in large unionized firms where DB
plans are used intensively.”
Further issues
The foregoing analysis suggests that there have
been substantial changes during the last twenty-
five years in the structure of retirement saving in
the United States. These changes portend signifi-
cant future changes in the way Americans finance
their retirement consumption. PVW [2001], for
example, project that average 401(k) balances for
the cohort retiring in 2025 will be roughly ten times
greater than the balances for those who retired in
the mid-1990s.
The sharp increase in retirement assets relative to
income stands in contrast to the apparently low
level of personal saving in the United States that is
shown in the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). This is in part an artifact of the
way the NIPA treats pension contributions. NIPA
saving equals disposable income less consumption,
so any increase in measured income increases sav-
ing, and any increase in measured consumption
decreases saving.Contributions to pension plans are
treated as income in the NIPAs, so these contribu-
tions increase saving.5 Interest and dividends
received by pension plans are also imputed as a
component of income, and pension plan manage-
ment fees are charged as a consumption outlay.
Neither capital gains on pension assets, nor distrib-
utions from pension plans, are included in NIPA
income.If distributions from pension plans are part-
ly consumed, however, the net effect of pension dis-
tributions will be to raise consumption and there-
fore, without any corresponding increase in income,
to reduce NIPA saving.In recent years,distributions
from DB plans and IRAs have far exceeded contri-
butions to these plans. Lusardi, Skinner, and Venti
[2001] estimate that in 1999,the NIPA accounting of
DB pension transactions alone reduced NIPA per-
sonal saving by almost $55 billion.
The shift from defined benefit to defined contribu-
tion plans has other implications that we have not
considered in this brief paper. One of the most
important may be changes in the labor market par-
ticipation incentives facing older workers. Most
defined benefit plans create substantial incentives
for workers to retire after they reach the plan’s
early retirement age, which typically occurs before
age 60. Defined contribution pension plans do not
distort the returns to labor market activity. As a
result, the shift to defined contribution plans may
result eventually in higher labor force participation
rates for older workers. This in turn would affect
the stock of retirement saving assets relative to
labor income, as individuals who remain in the
labor force for longer and contribute a given frac-
tion of income to retirement saving programs each
year are likely to accumulate a larger stock of
retirement wealth.
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